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BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and §78-22(3)(J) (U.C.A. 1989).

This appeal is from a final civil judg-

ment rendered by the Third District Court in Salt Lake County
sitting in probate which judgment rejected the claim of a
creditor, appellant Charter Thrift & Loan (Charter), because
Charter's claim had been filed in 1990 over two years after the
estate had completed publication of notice to creditors under the
applicable statute and because Charter had received actual notice
in 1987 of the probate during the period of notice.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. WAS CHARTER ENTITLED TO MORE NOTICE THAN THE APPLICABLE
STATUTE REQUIRED?
Applicable Standard of Review;

Lower court judgments

rendered as a matter of law are subject to appellate review
without giving deference to the lower court's conclusion.

Ron

Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382

(Utah 1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225
(Utah 1987).
II. DID DUE PROCESS REQUIRE PERSONAL WRITTEN NOTICE TO
CHARTER IN ADDITION TO THE 1987 PUBLICATION NOTICE THEN REQUIRED
BY STATUTE AND THE ACTUAL NOTICE GIVEN IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER,
1987 OF THE PROBATE, THE APPOINTMENT OF THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE AND THE IDENTITY OF THE ESTATE'S ATTORNEY?
Applicable Standard of Review:

Judgments rendered as a

matter of law by the lower court are basically reviewed de novo
on appeal.

Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blom-

quist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National
Bank., 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987).
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
S75-3-801 (U.C.A. 1975): Notice to creditors. Unless
notice has already been given under this section, a personal
representative upon his appointment shall publish a notice
once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the county announcing his appointment
and address and notifying creditors of the estate to present
their claims within three months after the date of the first
publication of the notice or be forever barred.
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, SI. [Citizenship - Due process
of law - Equal protection.] All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of laws.
Utah Const. Art. I, S7. [Due process of law.] No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Glenn C. Anderson, Jr. (Anderson) died on July 19, 1987. On
August 12, 1987 Anderson's will was filed for probate.

By

October, 1987 Anderson's personal representative and his former
attorney had both orally informed Charter of Anderson's probate,
the appointment of the personal representative and the identity
of the estate's attorney.

The required statutory notice was

published and proof of publication was filed on September 24,
1987.

Other creditors filed claims in 1987 and 1988.

Charter

did not file its claim until March, 1990 which claim was rejected
by the personal representative and then by the lower court.
Although there was no actual trial and there was no dispute of
material fact, the lower court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and the final order.

The district court denied

Charter's claim because Charter had actual notice of Anderson's
death, the probate, and the appointment of the personal representative, and because the personal representative had complied with
all the requirements of Section 75-3-801 (U.C.A. 1975), the
probate notice statute then in force.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Anderson died on July 19, 1987.

(R. 5)

2.

Probate was commenced on August 12, 1987 (R. 5) and

Shelley Jones (Jones) was appointed personal representative of
Anderson's estate.
3.

(R. 12)

Thereafter, notice to creditors was published and

completed in 1987 under the applicable notice statute, §75-3-801

3

(U.C.A. 1975).

(The statute was amended in 1989 to require

individual written notice to known creditors.)
4.

Some creditors filed claims against the estate in 1987

and 1988.
5.

(R. 26, 27)

During the period of publication, Jones talked on

several occasions to representatives of Charter and informed
Charter of Anderson's death, the probate, and her appointment as
personal representative.
6.

(R. 70)

During August, 1987 a representative of Charter also

contacted Anderson's former attorney, Walter P. Faber, Jr., who
then informed Charter of the probate, the appointment of Jones
and the identity of S. Dee Long, the attorney for the estate.
(R. 72)
7.

Jones did not give Charter any other notice.

8.

Charter first filed a claim against Anderson's estate in

March, 1990.

(R. 28)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

In 1987, Jones fully complied with the probate notice
statute (§75-3-801) then in effect and gave Charter actual oral
notice of the probate and her appointment.

The above information

was also given to Charter by Anderson's former attorney in
August, 1987 plus the identity of the estate's attorney, S. Dee
Long,in a call initiated by Charter.

Because Charter was given

actual as well as the required statutory notice, Charter was not
deprived of due process even though Charter did not receive
individual written notice of the three month period for presenting its claim.

ii

ARGUMENT
I. BECAUSE JONES FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE APPLICABLE
NOTICE STATUTE AND IN 1987 GAVE CHARTER ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE
PROBATE AND HER APPOINTMENT AND CHARTER WAS ALSO INFORMED OF
THE IDENTITY OF THE ESTATE'S ATTORNEY, THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF CHARTER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
The only substantive issue in this case is whether Charter
was denied due process because although Charter received actual
and timely notice of the probate, it did not receive individual
written notice to present its claim.

There is no dispute that

Charter had actual notice of the probate, the appointment of
Jones, and the identity of the estate's attorney prior to the
completion of the required statutory notice period.

Charter thus

had statutory as well as ample direct oral notice, and the
knowledge and opportunity to file its claim well within the three
month statutory claim period.

However, Charter's position is

that under the Due Process Clause it was entitled to personal
written notice (as is now required by the statutory provision
enacted two years later in 1989) to present its claim before such
claim need have been filed regardless that it had actual notice
and the notice statute then in effect was fully complied with by
Jones.
Charter principally bases its argument on the recent United
States Supreme Court case of Tulsa Professional Collection
Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988),
wherein the Supreme Court held that Oklahoma probate proceedings
were State action and that the creditor therein was thus entitled
to reasonable actual notice under the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution.

The Oklahoma statute provided that

5

creditors must present claims within two months after publication
or be forever barred.

In the Pope case, the creditor had no

actual notice of the probate during the two month period and
therefore did not present a claim during that period.

The

Supreme Court in the Pope case does not prescribe the type or
extent of the notice that should be given to comply with due
process in probate cases where State action is involved, but
states that "whether a particular method of notice is reasonable
depends on the particular circumstances."

108 S.Ct. at 1344.

In the Pope case, after an extended discussion of examples
of State actions wherein the Due Process Clause becomes applicable, the Supreme Court stated in regard to Oklahoma's
probate non-claim statute that:
. . . the Due Process Clause requires that Appellant [the
creditor] be given "[n]otice by mail or other means as
certain to insure actual notice." Mennonite, supra. at 800,
103 S.Ct., at 2712.
The Supreme Court in the Pope case cited two of its earlier
decisions, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), and Mennonite Board of
Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180
(1983) in regard to due process considerations in cases of notice
by publication.

In the Mennonite case the Supreme Court quoted

its decision in the Mullane case and stated that where there is
State action . . . "notice [must be] reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections."

. . . 103 S.Ct. @ 2709.

6

It is undisputed in this case that Charter had actual notice
from at least two sources of the commencement of the probate
proceedings, the appointment of the personal representative, and
the identity of the estate's attorney at the beginning of the
statutory notice period.

It is also undisputed that Charter

initiated the contact in August, 1987 with the decedent's former
attorney wherein Charter received the information on which it
could easily have filed a claim within the statutory period if it
had chosen to do so.

Under the facts of this case, Charter was

given reasonable actual notice prior to the time the statutory
notice period began, and therefore the oral notice given was
reasonable and fulfilled all due process requirements as stated
by the Supreme Court in the Pope, Mennonite and Mullane cases.
CONCLUSION
Because Charter had actual notice as well as the statutory
notice required at the time, the lower court properly determined
that under the undisputed facts there was no additional notice
required and Charter was not deprived of due process.

The

judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
DATED this

<XD

day of May, 1991.

s sy* /y^L

y£&K*~ ^

S. DEE LONG
^7
\/J
Attorney for Appellee\y

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing
to Mark S. Swan and Mark E. Medcalf, 311 South State, Suite 3 50,
Salt Lake City, UT 84111, postage prepaid, this j?/
1991.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF, :
GLENS CLAUGHTON ANDERSON,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

JR.,

97Pt<H>yt(*
:
Deceased.

Probate No. P-87-816
Judge Homer Wilkinson

The Petition of Allowance of Claim of Charter Thrift & Loan
against the estate of the above-named Decedent, and the Personal
Representative's denial of that claim came on for hearing on the
25th day of July, 1990, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding.
Creditor Charter Thrift & Loan appeared through their counsel, Mark
S. Swan of the law firm RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C., and the
Personal Representative appeared through her counsel, S. Dee Long.
The Court having considered the memoranda and affidavits submitted
by the various parties, and being fully advised herein, now makes
its:

ticnm

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Decedent, Glenn Claughton Anderson, Jr., died on the

19th day of July, 1987 and was a resident of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
2.

A probate was filed in the Third Judicial District Court

of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on the 12th day of August, 1987,
for the probate of Decedent's Will.
3.

Decedentfs

daughter,

Shelly

J.

Jones, was

appointed

Personal Representative of said estate.
4.

Said Personal Representative caused a notice to creditors

to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in accordance with
Utah Code Annotated, §75-3-801.
5.

Said Personal Representative, Shelly J. Jones, personally

contacted Charter Thrift & Loan by telephone and informed him of
her father's death, and that a probate had been filed, and that she
had been appointed Personal Representative of her father's estate.
6.

Charter Thrift & Loan did not have actual notice of the

publication of the Notice to creditors to submit claims nor actual
notice of the running of the claim bar period.
7.

Charter Thrift & Loan did not file a creditor's claim

within the three (3) months of publication as required by U.C.A.,
§75-3-801, and did not file a creditor's claim until March 1, 1990.
From the forgoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
inters its:

C008S

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction of both the parties and the

subject matter.
2.

The

Personal

Representative

of

the

estate

met

all

requirements of the Utah Uniform Probate Code in giving notice to
creditors.
3.

The constitutional due process rights of the creditor,

Charter Thrift & Loan, were not violated because said creditor had
received actual notice of the Decedentfs death, the filing of the
probate,

and

the

appointment

of

Shelly

J.

Jones

as

Personal

Representative.
4.

The creditor's claim of Charter Thrift & Loan was not

made within the statutory three month time period of the date of
first publication of notice to creditors as required by law, and
is

thus

forever

barred

against

the

estate,

the

personal

representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent.
DATED this

I

day of August, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

S. Dee Long

v

gn^ezr

(7y

G00 c

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

T*

day of Ms^se-t,

1990, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
Mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Shelley J. Jones, Personal Representative
2939 Brookburn Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
S. Dee Long
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for Personal Representative

/^<^j\^^^ ^
(4^.
£*<*£ )
Ch730700.c90

GG090

Mark S. Jwan - 3873
Mark E. Medcalf - 5404
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P-C.
A Professional Corporation
311 South State, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)539-8632
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Copper State Thrift & Loan

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

S E P - 4 1990
DeoutvCler*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF,

UKULK

GLENS CLAUGHTON ANDERSON,
JR. ,

p7$ ??V ?l 4
P r o b a t e No. P-87-816

Deceased.

Judge Homer Wilkinson

The hearing on the Petition of Charter Thrift

& Loan for

Allowance of Claims, and the denial of said claim by the Personal
Representative of the estate, came on for hearing on the 25th day
of July, 1990, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson.

Chartcr

Thrift & Loan appeared by and through its counsel, Mark S. Swan of
the

law

firm

Representative

RICHER,

SWAN

&

OVERHOLT,

of the estate appeared

counsel for the estate, S. Dee Long.

P.C.

through

The

Personal

her counsel

and

The Court having considered

all documents on file herein, having reviewed the memoranda and
affidavits

submitted

by the parties, having

heard

argument of

counsel, having heretofore signed and filed its Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises, it is hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the creditor's claim of
Charter Thrift & Loan against the above-named Decedent's estate is
hereby

disallowed

and

forever barred

against

the

estate,

the

Personal Representative and the heirs and devisees of the decedent.
DATED this

(

day o f A u ^ a t , 1990.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

-—/L

wCC

e Long
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

fr

day of August, 1990, J

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon
the following parties by placing the same in the United States
Mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Shelley J. Jones, Personal Representative
2939 Brookburn Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
S. Dee Long
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for Personal Representative
/ y ^
ch730700.c90
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FILED OlSTMCrcSuitT
Third Judicial District

JUL 17 1990
S. DEE LONG (A1990)
Attorney at Law
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 8*1109
Telephone: 486-5634

Dootitv Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
AFFIDAVIT %*\~ S U

GLENN CLAUGHTON ANDERSON, JR.,
Deceased.
STATE OF UTAH

Probate No.- £97816JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON

)

) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SHELLEY J. JONES, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

Following my father's death I had several conversations

with representatives of Charter Thrift & Loan.
2.

In some of those telephone conversations I specifically

stated to said representatives that my father's estate had been
placed in probate and that I had been appointed the Personal Representative of the estate.
3.

These telephone conversations wherein I indicated that

I was a Personal Representative took place within two months of my
father's death.
DATED this

\jc

day of July, 1990.

SHELLS J.JONE^)

-2Personally appeared before me, the undersigned Notary
Public, SHELLEY J. JONES, who after first being sworn stated that
she has read the foregoing and that the contents thereof are true to
the best of her own personal knowledge and belief , and she then
signed the same in my presence this /tym

da

y

of Ju

Notary Public

ly> 1990.

^ < CflZ)

Residing a t : J^</j <C&

T

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public
BARBARA W THURGOOD
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
My Commission Expires
November 10 1992
State of Utah

;
I
i
I
I
|

CJ

Third !tir»i/>.j<»i District

JUL 17 1990
S. DEE LONG (A1990)
Attorney at Law
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84109
Telephone: 486-5634

$* &£i iff" ~it£lt/As

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:
GLENN CLAUGHTON ANDERSON, JR.,
Deceased.

AFFIDAVIT

..

Probate No. Wf$±&

* ' ^

JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE )
WALTER P. PABER, JR., being first duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

Affiant is an attorney licensed to practice in the

State of Utah,
2.

I was legal counsel for Glenn Claughton Anderson,

Jr. prior to his death.
3.

Following the death of Mr. Anderson on July 19, 1987

I had telephone conversations with representatives of Charter Thrift
& Loan who telephoned in August, 1987 wherein I informed them that
Mr. Anderson's estate had been placed in probate, that Shelley
J. Jones had been appointed the Personal Representative of the
estate, and that S. Dee Long was the attorney for the estate.
DATED this

/^'

day of July, 1990-

-2Personally appeared before me, the undersigned Notary Public,
WALTER P. PABER, JR., who after first bei* - sworn stated that he has
read the foregoing and that the contents thereof are true to the best
of his personal knowledge and belief , and he then signed the same in
my presence this

day of July, 1990
;>

v/o ((( <a c <^J / s?a < [fVCs1

^Totary Public

>

Residing at: K^J<L_
-^

My Commission Expires
Notary Public
BAR8ARAW THURGOC0
2102 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
My Commission Expires
November 10 1992
State of Utah

/

U /
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will derive any solace from the knowledge reasonably ascertainable creditors of est
that although the practice of their religion that noncjaim statute had began to r
will become "more difficult" as a result lA
Reversed and remanded.
the Government's actions, they remain free
Justice Biackmun concurred in res
to maintain their religious beliefs. Given
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented ;
today's ruling, that freedom amounts to
filed
opinion.
nothing more than the right to believe that
their religion will be destroyed. The safeguarding of such a hollow freedom not only 1. Constitutional Law *»277U)
makes a mockery of the " 'policy of the
Creditor's cause of action against d<
United States to protect and preserve for dent's estate for unpaid bill is protec
American Indians their inherent right of property interest, for due process \
freedom to believe, express, and exercise poses. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
the[ir] traditional religions/" ante at, 2. Constitutional Law *=>254(2, 4)
1327-1328 (quoting AIRFA), it fails utterly
Fourteenth Amendment only proU
to accord with the dictates of the First property interests from deprivation
Amendment.
state action; private use of state s<
I dissent.
tioned private remedies or procedures d
not rise to level of state action, but w
private parties make use of state pr«
dures with overt, significant assistance
state officials, state action may be foi
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.

TULSA PROFESSIONAL COLLECTION
SERVICES, INC., Appellant
v.
JoAnne POPE, Executrix of the Estate of
H. Everett Pope, Jr., Deceased.
No. 86-1961.
Argued March 2, 1988.
Decided April 19, 1988.
Creditor's assignee instituted suit to
compel estate's payment of expenses of
decedent's last illness. The District Court,
Tulsa County, Robert D. Frank, J., held
claim was time barred, and assignee appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
and assignee sought review. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, 733 P.2d 3%, Lavender, J., affirmed, and assignee appealed.
The Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor, held
that due process required actual notice to
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion

3. Constitutional Law <S=»30S
Due process does not require that
tential plaintiffs be given notice of imp*
ing expiration of period of limitati*
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14.
4. Constitutional Law *»254(2)
Executors and Administrators $»2
Oklahoma's nonclaim statute is
self-executing, in that probate court's
volvement in appointing executor is ne
sary to activate time bar, and thus tl
was sufficient state action to give rise
due process requirement of actual mail
tice to known or reasonably ascertain;
creditors, rather than mere notice by pi
cation, which was sufficient only for cr
tors who are not reasonably ascertain:
or who held merely conjectural claims.
O.S.1981, §§ 381, 383; U.S.C.A. Co
Amend. 14.
Syllabus#
Under the nonclaim provision of C
homa's probate code, creditors' ck
of the Court but has been prepared by the

TULSA PROFESSIONAL COLLECTION SERVICES v. POPE

1341

CtUMtOS S.Ct. 1340 (IMS)

against an estate are generally barred unless they are presented to the executor or
executrix within two months of the publication of notice of the commencement of probate proceedings. Appellee executrix published the required notice in compliance
with the terms of the nonclaim statute and
i probate court order, but appellant, the
assignee of a hospital's claim for expenses
connected with the decedent's final illness,
failed to file a timely claim. For this reason, the probate court denied appellant's
application for payment, and both the State
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting apoellant's contention
that, in failing to req~.re more than publication notice, the nonciaim statute violated
due process. That contention was based
upon Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct 652,
94 LEd. 865, which Md that state action
that adversely affecfi aroperty interests
roust be accompanied ay such notice as is
reasonable under the particular circumstances, balancing the State's interest and
the due process interests of individuals,
and Mennonite Board of Missions v.
Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct 2706, 77
LEd.2d 180, which generally requires actu-_
al noticjLto an affected party whose name
and address are "reasonably ascertainable."

volvement throughout the probate proceedings—particularly the court's activation of
the statute's time bar by the appointment
of an executor or executrix—is so pervasive and substantial that it must be considered state action. Nor can there be any
doubt that the statute may "adversely affect" protected property interests, since untimely claims such as appellant's are completely extinguished. On balance, satisfying creditors' substantial, practical need for
actual notice in the probate setting is not
so cumbersome or impracticable as to unduly burden the State's undeniably legitimate interest in the expeditious resolution
of the proceedings, sine* mail service
(which is already routinely provided at several points in the probate process) is inexpensive, efficient, and reasonably calculated to provide actual notice, and since publication notice will suffice for creditors
whose identities are not ascertainable by
reasonably diligent efforts or whose claims
are merely conjectural. Pp. 1344-1348.
733 P.2d 396 (Okl.1986), reversed and
remanded.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion
of the Court, in which BRENNAN,
WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., concurred in the result. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Held: If appellant's identity as a creditor was known or "reasonably ascertainRandall E. Rose, Tulsa, Okl., for appelable" by appellee (a fact which cannot be
lant.
determined from the present record), the
Phillip K. Smith, Tulsa, Okl., for appelDue Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as interpreted by Mullane lee.
and Mennonite, requires that appellant be
Justice O'CONNOR delivered the
given notice by mail or such other means
as is certain tq ensure actual flQflre, Ap- opinion of the Court.
pellant's claim is properly considered a
This case involves a provision of Oklaproperty interest protected by the Clause. homa's probate laws requiring claims "arisMoreover, the nonclaim statute is not sim- ing upon a contract" generally to be
ply a self-exectting statute of limitations. presented to the executor or executrix of
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 the estate within 2 months of the publicaS.Ct 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738, distinguished. tion of a notice advising creditors of the
Rather, the probate court's intimate in- commencement of probate proceedings.
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader. Sec United States v. Detroit Lumber Co.,

200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed.
499.
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OkhuStat, Tit 58, 5 338 (1981). The question presented is whether this provision of
notice solely by publication satisfies the
Due Process Clause.

Code, for example, provides that crediton
have 4 months from publication in which to
file claims.
Uniform Probate Code
§ 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983). See also, «.*,
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14-3801 (1975); FTa.
Stat § 733.701 (1987); Utah Code Ann.
I
Oklahoma's probate code requires credi- § 75-3-801 (x978).
tors to file claims against an « state within
The specific nonclaim statute at issue in
a specified time period, and generally bars this case, Okla.Stat, Tit. 58, § 333 (1981),
untimely claims. Ibid Such "nonclaim provides for only a short time period and is
statutes" are almost universally included in best considered in the context of Oklahoma
state probate codes. See Uniform Probate probate proceedings as a whole. Under
Code § 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983); Falen- Oklahoma's probate code, any party inter
der, Notice to Creditors in Estate Proceed- ested in the estate may initiate probate
ings: What Process is Due?, 63 N.C.L.Rev. proceedings by petitioning the court to
659, 667-668 (1985). Giving creditors a lim- have the will proved. § 22. Tift court is
ited time in which to file claims against the then required to set a hearing date on the
estate serves the State's interest in facili- petition, § 25, and to mail notice of the
tating the administration and expeditious hearing "to all heirs, legatees and devisees,
closing of estates. See, e.g., State ex rel at their places of residence," §§ 25, 26. If
Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital no person appears at the hearing to contest
v. Reea\ 493 P.2d 815, 818 (Okla.1972). the will, the court may admit the will to
Nonclaim statutes come in two basic forms. probate on the testimony of one of the
Some provide a relatively short time period, subscribing witnesses to the will. § 30.
generally 2 to 6 months, that begins to run After the will is admitted to probate, the
after the commencement of probate pro- court must order appointment of an execuceedings. Others call for a longer period, tor or executrix, issuing letters testamentagenerally 1 to 5 years, that runs from the ry to the named executor or executrix if
decedent's death. See Falender, supra, at that person appears, is competent and qual664-672. Most States include both types of ified, and no objections are made. § 101.
nonclaim statutes in their probate codes,
Immediately after appointment, the exectypically providing that if probate proceed- utor or executrix is required to "give notice
ings are not commenced and the shorter to the creditors of the deceased." § 331.
period therefore never is triggered, then Proof of compliance with this requirement
claims nonetheless may be barred by the must be filed with the court. § 332. This
longer period. See, e.g.t Ark.Code Ann. notice is to advise creditors that they must
§ 28-50-101(a), (d) (1987) (3 months if pro- present their claims to the executor or exbate proceedings commenced; 5 years if ecutrix within 2 months of the date of the
not); Idaho Code § 15-3-803(a)(l), (2) first publication. As for the method of
(1979) (4 months; 3 years); Mo.Rev.Stat. notice, the statute requires only publica§ 473.360(1), (3) (1986) (6 months; 3 years). tion: "[S]uch notice must be published in
Most States also provide that creditors are some newspaper in [the] county once each
to be notified of the requirement to file week for two (2) consecutive weeks."
claims imposed by the nonclaim statutes § 331. A creditor's failure to file a claim
solely by publication. See Uniform Pro- within the 2-month period generally bars it
bate Code § 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983); forever. § 333. The nonclaim statute does
Falender, supra, at 660, n. 7 (collecting provide certain exceptions, however. If the
statutes). Indeed, in most jurisdictions it is creditor is out of State, then a claim "may
the publication of notice that triggers the be presented at any time before a decree of
nonclaim statute. The Uniform Probate distribution is entered." § 333. Mortgag-
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m and debts not yet due are also excepted
from the 2-month time limit
This shorter type of nonclaim statute is
the only one included in Oklahoma's probite code. Delays in commencement of
probate proceedings are dealt with not
through some independent, longer period
running from the decedent's death, see,
e*, Ark. Code Ann. § 28-50-101(d) (1987),
bat by shortening the notice period once
proceedings have started. Section 331 prorides that if the decedent has been dead for
more than 5 years, then creditors have only
1 month after notice is published in which
to file their claims. A similar 1-month
period applies if the decedent was intestate.
f 331.
II
H. Everett Pope, Jr. was admitted to St
John Medical Center, a hospital in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, in November 1978. On April 2,
1979, while still at the hospital, he died
testate. His wife, appellee JoAnne Pope,
initiated probate proceedings in the District
fom*-ji£ T"lsa County in accordance with
the statutory scheme outlined above. The
court entered an order setting a hearing.
Record 8. After the hearing the court
entered an order Emitting the will to probite and, following the designation in the
will, id, at 2, named appellee as the executrix of the estate. Id, at 12. Letters
testamentary were issued, id., at 13, and
the court ordered appellee to fulfill her
ttttutory obligation by directing that she
"immediately give notice to creditors." Id,
it 14. Appellee published notice in the
Tttisa Daily Legal News for 2 consecutive
weeks beginning July 17,1979. The notice
idrised creditors that they must file any
diim they had against the estate within 2
aonths of the first publication of the notice. Id, at 16.

with appellee within the 2-month time period following publication of notice. In October 1983, however, appellant filed an Application for Order Compelling Payment of
Expenses of Last Illness, Id, at 28. In
making this application, appellant relied on
Okla. Stat, Tit. 58, § 594 (1981), which
indicates that an executrix "must pay . . .
the expenses of the last sickness." Appellant argued that this specific statutory
command made compliance with the 2month deadline for filing claims unnecessary. The District Court of Tulsa County
rejected this contention, ruling that even
claims pursuant to § 594 fell within the
general requirements of the nonclaim statute. Accordingly, the court denied appellant's application. App. 3.

The District Court's reading of g 594's
relationship to the nonclaim statute was
attirmecl by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals. App. 7. Appellant then sought rehearing, arguing for the first time that the
nonclaim statute's notice provisions violated due process. In a supplemental opinion
on rehearing the Court of Appeals rejected
the due process claim on the merits. Id, at
15.
Appellant next sought review in the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. That court
granted certiorari and nf^r rpvigiiTof frith
the § 594 ^ncj due procesaJssues. affirmed
theTburt^^pjreals' judgment With respect to the federal issue, the court relied
on Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan
Clinic, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 86, 88-89 (Mo.
1985), to reject appellant's contention that
our decisions in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70
S.Ct 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), and Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S.
791, 103 S.Ct 2706, 77 LEd.2d 180 (1983),
required more than publication notice. 733
P.2d 396 (1987). The Supreme Court reaAppellant Tulsa Professional Collection soned that the function of notice in probate
Services, Inc., is a subsidiary of St John proceedings was not to " 'make a creditor a
Medical Center and the assignee of a claim party to the proceeding'" but merely to
for expenses connected with the decedent's " *notif[y] him that he may become one if
bog stay at that hospital. Neither appel- he wishes.' " Id., at 400 (quoting Estate of
kat, nor its parent company, filed a claim Busch, 700 S.W.2d, at 88). In addition, the
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court distinguished probate proceedings because they do not directly adjudicate the
creditor's claims. 733 P.2d, at 400-401.
Finally, the court agreed with Estate of
Busch that nonclaim statutes were self-executing statutes of limitations, because
they "ac[t] to cut off potential claims
against the decedent's estate by the passage of time," and accordingly do not require actual notice. 738 P.2d, at 401. See
also Gibbs v. Estate o/Dolan, 146 Ill.App.
3d 203, 100 Ill.Dec. 61, 496 N.E.2d 1126
(1986) (rejecting due process challenge to
nonclaim statute); Gano Farms, Inc. v.
Estate ofKleweno, 2 Kan.App.2d 506, 582
P.2d 742 (1978) (same); Chalaby v. Driskell, 237 Or. 245, 390 P.2d 632 (1964)
(same); William B. Tanner Co. v. Estate
ofFessler, 100 Wis.2d 437, 302 N.W.2d 414
(1981) (same); New York Merchandise Co.
v. Stout, 43 Wash.2d 825, 264 P.2d 868
(1953) (same). This conclusion conflicted
with that reached by the Nevada Supreme
Court in Continental Insurance Co. v.
Moseley, 100 Nev. 337, 683 P.2d 20 (1984),
after our decision remanding the case for
reconsideration in light of Mennonite, supra. 463 U.S. 1202, 103 S.Ct 3530, 77
LEd.2d 1383 (1983). In Moseley, the Nevada Supreme Court held that in this context
due process required "more than service by
publication." Id., at 338, 683 P.2d, at 21.
Wft nftted probable lurisdictfon. 484 U.S.
- — , 108 S.Ct 62, 98 L.Ed.2d 26 (1987), and
now reverse and remand.
HI
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., supra, 339 U.S., at 314, 70 S.Ct,
at 657, established that state action affecting property must generally be accompanied by notification of that action: "An
elementary and fundamental requirement
of due process in any proceeding which is
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." In the
years since Mullane the Court has adhered

to these principles, balancing the "interest
of the State" and "the individual interest
sought to be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment" Ibid. The focus is on the
reasonableness of the balance, and, as Mul
lane itself made clear, whether a particular
metnoQ of n o f e fo ^flgpn&ble jjepend8"l)n
the particular circumstances.
The Court's most recent decision in this
area is Mennonite, supra, which involved
the sale of real property for delinquent
taxes. State law provided for tax sales in
certain circumstances and for a 2-year period following any such sale during which
the owner or any lienholder could redeem
the property. After expiration of the redemption period, the tax sale purchaser
could apply for a deed. The property owner received actual notice of the tax sale and
the redemption period. All other interested
parties were given notice by publication.
462 U.S., at 792-794, 103 S.Ct, at 27082709. In Mennonite, a mortgagee of property that had been sold and on which the
redemption period had run complained that
the State's failure to provide it with actual
notice of these proceedings violated due
process. The Court agreed, holding that
"actual notice is a minimum constitutional
precondition to a proceeding wjfijcfr wflTJd*
verseiv aflyct tKe IIKPI^Y g r BJfP^Y int**
ests of any party. w^tfi<>r iin1o»t^p>H $?
well versed in commerqa| practice, if its
name and address are reasonably ascertainable." Id., at 800, 103 S.Ct, at 2712 (em"phasis in original). Because the tax sale
had "immediately and drastically diminishe[d] the value of [the mortgagee's] interest," id., at 798, 103 S.Ct, at 2711, and
because the mortgagee could have been
identified through "reasonably diligent efforts," id., at 798, n. 4, 103 S.Ct, at 2711,
n. 4, the Court concluded that due process
required that the mortgagee be given actual notice.
[1] Applying these principles to the
cjmg ^ foand leads to a similar result Appellant's interest is an unsecured claim, a.
cause of action against the estafr fo[M
unpaid bill. Little doubt remains that such
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in intangible interest is property protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment As we
wrote in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
466 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct 1148, 1154, 71
L£d.2d 265 (1982), this question "was affirmatively settled by the Mullane case
itself, where the Court held that a cause of
action IB a species of property protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause." In Logan, the Court held that a
cause of action under Illinois' Fair Employment Practices Act was a protected property interest, and referred to the numerous
other types of claims that the Court had
previously recognized as deserving due process protection See id, at 429-431, and
on. 4-5, 102 S.Ct, at 1154-1155, and nn.
4-5. Appellant's claim, therefore, is properly considered a protected property interest

then points to Short, supra. Appellee's
reading of Short is correct—due process
does not require that potential plaintiffs be
given notice of the impending expiration of
a period of limitations—but in our view,
appellee's premise is not Oklahoma's nonclaim statute is not a self-executing statute
of limitations.
It is true that nonclaim statutes generally possess some attributes of statutes of
limitations. They provide a specific time
period within which particular types of
claims must be filed and they bar claims
presented after expiration of that deadline.
Many of the state court decisions upholding
nonclaim statutes against due process challenges have relied upon these features and
concluded that they are properly viewed as
statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Estate of
Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc., 700
S.W.2d, at 89; William B. Tanner Co. v.
Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis.2d 437, 302
N.W.2d 414 (1981).

[2] The Fourteenth Amendment protects this interest, however, only from a
deprivation by state action. Private use of
state sanctioned private remedies or proceAs we noted in Short, however, it is the
dures does not rise to the level of state
"self-executing feature" of a statute of
•etion. See, e.g.f Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
limitations that makes Mullane and MenBrooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct 1729, 56
nonite inapposite. See 454 U.S., at 533,
LEd.2d 185 (1978). Nor is the State's in536, 102 S.Ct, at 794, 796. The State's
volvement in the mere running of a general
interest in a self-executing statute of limistatute of limitation generally sufficient to
tations is in providing repose for potential
implicate due process. See Texaco, Inc. v.
- defendants and in avoiding stale claims.
asrfU54 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct 781, 70 L.Ed.
The State has no role to play beyond enactM738 (1982). See also Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
ment of the limitations period. While this
Brooks, supra, 436 U.S., at 166, 98 S.Ct, at
enactment obviously is state action, the
1738. But when private parties make use
State's limited involvement in the running
of state procedures with the ftvert siy^jfiof the time period generally falls short of
qnt assistance of state officials, state acconstituting the type of state action retion npY fre found. See, e.g., Lugar v.
quired to implicate the protections of the
Bdmondson Oil C», 457 U.S. 922, 102
Due Process Clause.
S.Ct 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); Sniaisch v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
[4] Here, in contrast, there is signifi87, 89 S.Ct 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969). cant state action. The probate court is
fte Question here is whfith*r tJu> StutVa intimately involved throughout and withinvolvement with the nonclaim statute is out that involvement the time bar is never
substantial enough to implicate the Due activated. The nonclaim statute becomes
ftocessClause.
operative only after probate proceedings
(31 Appellee argues that it is not, con- have been commenced in state court. The
tending that Oklahoma's nonclaim statute court must appoint the executor or execuis i self-executing statute of limitations. trix before notice, which triggers the time
Belying on this characterization, appellee bar, can be given. Only after this court
tOSASCt—17
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appointment is made does the statute provide for any notice; § 331 directs the executor or executrix to publish notice "immediately" after appointment Indeed, in this
case, the District Court reinforced the statutory command with an order expressly
requiring appellee to "immediately give notice to creditors." The form of the order
indicates that such orders are routine.
Record 14. Finally, copies of the notice
and an affidavit of publication must be
filed with the court. § 332. It is only
after all of these actions take place that the
time period begins to run, and in every one
of these actions, the court is intimately
involved. This involvement is so pervasive
and substantial that it must be considered
state action subject to the restrictions of
the Fourteenth Amendment

vide for longer time periods, ranging fan
1 to 5 years. See Falender, 68 N.C;L.Rer,
at 667-669. In sum, the substantial involvement of the probate court throughout
the process leaves little doubt that the run*
ning of Oklahoma's nonclaim statute is •*
companied by sufficient government actios
to implicate the Due Process Clause.
Nor can there be any doubt that the
nonclaim statute may "adversely affect" i
protected property interest In appellant's
case, such an adverse affect is all too clour.
The entire purpose and effect of the no*
claim statute is to regulate the timeliness
of such claims and to forever bar untimely
claims, and by virtue of the statute, the
probate proceedings themselves have completely extinguished appellant's claim.
Thus, it is irrelevant that the notice seeks
Where the legal proceedings themselves only to advise creditors that they may be*
trigger the time bar, even if those proceed- come parties rather than that they are ptr>
ings do not necessarily resolve the claim on ties, for if they do not participate in tin
its merits, the time bar lacks the self-execu- probate proceedings, the nonclaim statute
ting feature that Short indicated was nec- terminates their property interests. It is
essary to remove any due process problem. not necessary for a proceeding to directly
Rather, in such circumstances, due process adjudicate the merits of a claim in order to
is directly implicated and actual notice gen- "adversely affect" that interest In Menerally is required. Cf. Mennonite, 462 nonite itself, the tax sale proceedings did
U.S., at 793-794, 103 S.Ct, at 2708-2709 not address the merits of the mortgagee's
(tax sale proceedings trigger 2-year re- claim. Indeed, the tax sale did not eves
demption period); Logan v. Zimmerman completely extinguish that claim, it merefr
Brush Co., supra, 455 U.S., at 433, 437, "diminishefd] the value" of the interest
102 S.Ct, at 1156, 1158 (claim barred if no 462 U.S., at 798, 103 S.Ct, at 2711. Y*
hearing held 120 days after action com- the Court held that due process required
menced); City of New York v. New York, that the mortgagee be given actual noties
N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 294, 73 S.Ct of the tax sale. See also Memphis Light
299, 300, 97 L.Ed. 333 (1953) (bankruptcy Gas A Water Division v. Craft, 436 U M
proceedings trigger specific time period in 98 S.Ct 1554, 56 LEd.2d 30 (1978) (tam
which creditors' claims must be filed). Our nation of utility service); Schroeder v. City
conclusion that the Oklahoma nonclaim of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 83 S.Ct 279,1
statute is not a self-executing statute of L.Ed.2d 255 (1962) (condemnation proceed*
limitations makes it unnecessary to consid- ing); City of New York v. New York, NM.
er appellant's argument that a 2-month & H.R. Co., supra (bankruptcy code's reperiod is somehow unconstitutionally short. quirement of "reasonabljknotice" requirss
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22 (advocating consti- actual notice of deadline for filing claims).
tutional requirement that the States proIn assessing the propriety of actual novide at least 1 year). We also have no tice in this context consideration should be
occasion to consider the proper character- given to the practicalities of the situatMi
ization of nonclaim statutes that run from and the effect that requiring actual not»
the date of death, and which generally pro- mav hav<f on important state interests,
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Hennmite, supra, 462 U.S., at 798-799,
108 S.Ct, at 2711-2712; Mullane, 839 U.S.,
It 813-314, 70 S.Ct, at 656-667. As the
Court noted in Mullane, "[c]hance alone
brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper." IdL,
•t 815, 70 S.Ct, at 658. Creditors, who
bve a strong interest in maintaining the
integrity of their relationship with their
debtors, are particularly unlikely to benefit
from publication notice. Aq a claa^ credimay not be aware of a debtor's death
er oFine institution ofjarobaite proceeding.
Moreover, the executor or executrix will
often be, as is the case here, a party with a
beneficial interest in the estate. This could
diminish an executor's or executrix's inqli;
^ n l o " c a » atfentfrfl fo

thp

pnti>ntiftI..PYpir

i|gonjtLa creditors claim.. There is thus a
substantial practical need for actual notice
in this setting.

at 2711, 2712; Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S.
444, 455, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 1880, 72 L.Ed.2d
249 (1982); Mullane, supra, 339 U.S., at
319, 70 S.Ct, at 659. In addition, Mullane
disavowed any intent to require "impracticable and extended searches . . . in the
name of due process." 339 U.S., at 317318, 70 S.Ct, at 658-659. As the Court
indicated in Mennonite, all that the execuP
tor or MMUtrix heed do is make "reasonably diligent efforts," Wl U.S., at 7W, n. I,
'IDS S.Ct, at 5?/II, h. 4, to uncover the
"jfflffoH 0 f Crftflfr11'*! For creditors who
are not "reasonably ascertainable/' publication notice can suffice. Nor is everyone
who may conceivably have a claim properly
considered a creditor entitled to actual notice. Here, as in Mullane, it is reasonable
to dispense with actual notice to those with
mere "conjectural" claims. 339 U.S., at
317, 70 S.Ct, at 659.

On balance then, a requirement of actual
notice
to known or reasonably ascertainAt the same time, the State undeniably
able
creditors
is not so cumbersome as to
In a legitimate interest in the expeditious
unduly
hinder
the
dispatch with which proresolution of probate proceedings. Death
bate
proceedings
are
conducted. Notice by
transforms the decedent's legal relation*
mail
is
already
routinely
provided at severihips and a State could reasonably conclude that swift settlement of estates is so al points in the probate process. In Oklaimportant that it calls for very short time homa, for example, § 26 requires that
deadlines for filing claims. As noted, the "heirs, legatees, and devisees" be mailed
ihnost uniform practice is to establish such notice of the initial hearing on the will.
ibort deadlines, and to provide only publi- Accord Uniform Probate Code § 3-403, 8
cation notice. See, e.g., Ariz.Rev.StatAnn. U.L.A. 274 (1983). Indeed, a few States
§14-5801 (1975); Ark. Code Ann. already provide for actual notice in connecf 28-50-101(a) (1987); Fla.Stat § 733.701 tion with short nonclaim statutes. See,
(1987); Idaho Code § 15-3-803(a) (1979); e.g., Calif. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 9050, 9100
Mo.Stat § 473.360(1) (1986); Utah Code (Supp.1988); Nev.Rev.Stat §§ 147.010,
Ann. $ 75-3-801 (1978). See also Uniform 155.010, 155.020 (1987); W.Va.Code §§ 44Probate Code § 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983); 2-2, 44-2-4 (1982). We do not believe that
Faknder, supra, at 660, n. 7 (collecting requiring adherence to such a standard will
statutes). Providing actual notice to be so burdensome or impracticable as to
known or reasonably ascertainable credi- warrant reliance on publication notice
tors, however, is not inconsistent with the alone.
foals reflected in nonclaim statutes. ActuIn analogous situations we have rejected
al notice need not be inefficient or burden- similar arguments that a pressing need to
some. We have repeatedly recognized that proceed expeditiously justifies less than acmail service is an inexpensive ana etncient tual notice. For example, while we have
•qfflf ™W ^^}j_nu^tbly
calculatedto recognized that in the bankruptcy context
provide actual notice. See, e.g., Mennon- there is a noed for prompt administration
tie, supra, 462 U.sT, at 799, 800, 103 S.Ct, of claims, United Savings Assn. of Texas
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v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd,
484 U.S.
,
, 108 S.Ct 626,
, 98
L.Ed.2d 740 (1988), we also have required
actual notice in bankruptcy proceedings.
Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 87
S.Ct 274, 17 L.Ed.2d 197 (1966); City of
New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.,
supra. See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, 339 U.S., at
318-319, 70 S.Ct, at 659 (trust proceedings). Probate proceedings are not so different in kind that a different result is
required here.

for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice BLACKMUN concurs in the
result

Chief Justice REHNQUIST
dissenting.
In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 518,
102 S.Ct 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982), the
Court upheld against challenge under the
Due Process Clause an Indiana statute providing that severed mineral interests which
Whether appellant's identity as a creditor had not been used for a period of 20 yean
was known or reasonably ascertainable by lapsed and reverted to the surface owner
appellee cannot be answered on this record. unless the mineral owner filed a statement
Neither the Oklahoma Supreme Court nor of claim in the appropriate county office.
the Court of Appeals nor the District Court In the present case Oklahoma has enacted
considered the question. Appellee of a statute providing that a contractual claim
course was aware that her husband en- against a decedent's estate is barred if not
dured a long stay at St John Medical Cen- presented as a claim within two months of
ter, but it is not clear that this awareness the publication of notice advising creditor!
translates into a knowledge of appellant's of the commencement of probate proceedclaim. We therefore must remand the case ings. The Court holds the Oklahoma statfor further proceedings to determine ute unconstitutional.
whether "reasonably diligent efforts,"
Obviously there is a great difference be*
Mennonite, supra, 462 U.S., at 798, n. 4,
tween the 20-year time limit in the Indiana
108 S.Ct, at 2711, n. 4, would have identistatute and the 2-month time limit in the
fied appellant and uncovered its claim. If
Oklahoma statute, but the Court does not
appellant's identity was known or "reasonrest the constitutional distinction between
ably ascertainable," then termination of apthe cases on this fact Instead, the consti*
pellant's claim without actual notice violattutional distinction is premised on the abed due process.
sence in Texaco, Inc., of the "signifies*
state action" present in this case. In the
words of the Court
IV
"The nonclaim statute becomes operative
We hold that Oklahoma's nonclaim statonly after probate proceedings have bees
ute is not a self-executing statute of limitacommenced in state court The court
tions. Rather, the statute operates in conmust appoint the executor or executrix
nection with Oklahoma's probate proceedbefore notice, which triggers the time
ings to "adversely affect" appellant's propbar, can be given. Only after this court
erty interest Thus, if appellant's identity
appointment is made does the statute
as a creditor was known or "reasonably
provide for any notice; § 331 directs the
ascertainable," then the Due Process
executor or executrix to publish notice
Clause requires that appellant be given
"immediately"
after
appointment*
"[njotice by mail or other means as certain"
Ante, at 1345-1346.
to ensure actual notice." Mennonite, suJust why the due process implications of
pra, at 800, 103 S.Ct, at 2712. Accordingly, the judgment of the Oklahoma Supreme these two cases should turn upon the "acCourt is reversed and the case is remanded tivity" of the Oklahoma Probate Court ii
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lot made clear. Surely from the point of
mw of the claimant—for whom, after all,
Ike Due Process Clause is designed to benefit—the difference between having the
ine bar to his claim activated by a notice
piblished by a court-appointed executor, as
I was here, and having the time bar actiftted by acquisition of the mineral interest,
m it was in Indiana, makes little if any
difference.
The owner of a mineral interest in
bdiana who neither made any use of it for
V years nor filed a statement of claim,
would lose a quiet title action brought in
(be Indiana courts against him by the surface owner because those courts would apply the 20-year statute of limitations. The
petitioner in the present caslHost a suit in
the Oklahoma courts because those courts
applied the 2-month statute of limitations
eootained in the Oklahoma probate statute.
Why there is "state action" in the latter
cue, but not in the former, remains a
•ystery which is in no way elucidated by
the court's opinion. The factual differaees which the court points out, showing
Ikt the probate court is "intimately inlohred" in the application of the Oklahoma
lODclaim statute, seem to me trivial.

probate court. But by and large, the typical probate proceeding—and the one involved in the instant case seems to have
followed that pattern—is uncontested, and
the publication of notice to creditors simply
shortens the otherwise applicable statute
of limitations.
The "intimate involvement" of the Probate Court in the present case was entirely
of an administrative nature.
Would this Court have struck down the
Indiana mineral lapse statute involved in
Texaco, Inc., if that statute had provided—
as an additional protection to mineral
owners—that a state official should publish
notice to all mineral owners of the effect of
the operation of the lapse statute? I find it
difficult to believe that would be the case,
and yet the thrust of the Court's reasoning
today points in that direction. Virtually
meaningless state involvement, or lack of
it, rather than the effect of the statute in
question on the rights of the party whose
claim is cut off, is held dispositive.

The Court observes that in Oklahoma, it
is the court-ordered publication of notice
that triggers the running of the statute of
limitations. This judicial involvement, the
Probate proceedings have been traditionally uncontested and administrative, de- Court concludes, is inconsistent with th£
aigned to transfer assets from someone "self executing feature," of the time bar in
who has died to his successors. Before Texaco, Inc. Ante, at 1346. This reading
writing these transfers, probate codes uni- of the term "self executing" is, I believe,
versally require that the estate settle the out of context and contrary to common
debts of the decedent, and to do this it is sense. That term refers only to the abMcessary that claims against the estate be sence of a judicial or other determination
•nhaled and proved. Ante, at 1347. that itself extinguishes the claimant's
Once the debts of the estate are paid, the rights. This is made clear by the Texaco,
lecessary steps can be taken to distribute Inc., Court's juxtaposition of "the self exeie remainder of the property.
cuting feature of the [Indiana] statute and
Occasionally there may be a disputed a subsequent judicial determination that a
ebim against the estate, which is then in particular lapse did in fact occur." 454
•oit jurisdictions tried like any other civil U.S., at 533, 102 S.Ct, at 794. Certainly
ant Occasionally there may be a dispute the Oklahoma provision is more like the
0m the validity of the will, with a result- former than the latter, and there is no
art will contest. Occasionally there may reason to conclude that the perfunctory
ke objections to the account of the executor administrative involvement of the Oklair the administrator, which are then in homa probate court triggers a greater level
wit jurisdictions heard and decided by the of due process protection.
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Reversed.
Justice O'Connor did not participate.
1. Statutes <*=»54
Test for federal preemption of Puerto
Rico law is same as test under supremacy
clause for preemption of law of state. U.S.
C.A. Const Art. 6, cl. 2.
2. Statutes «=»54
War and National Emergency *=>103,
302
Congress' passage and subsequent repeal of comprehensive federal statutes providing for allocation and price controls on
petroleum products did not manifest congressional intent to preempt gasoline price
regulation by Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico in favor of free market controL
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of
1973, § 2 et seq.f as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 751 et seq.; U.S.C.A. Const Art 6, cl. 2.
3. States «=>18.3
Clear and manifest preemptive purpose
is always required, before federal legislation can be found to supersede historic
police power of states. U.S.C.A. Const
Art. 6, cl. 2.
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